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Abstract 
 
Europe’s competitiveness in the global economy depends increasingly on an efficient and cost effective 
transport and port system. In the EU, Ports are becoming no different from any other multi-product 
industry offering a range of services and operating under different environments and organizational 
structures. Many port infrastructures and services are owned or managed by the private sector. In spite of 
the lack of standardization and homogeneity in ports, the European Commission is keen to adopt a 
common approach to pricing in ports. Therefore, a European Commission White Paper (1998) suggests 
the application of marginal social cost pricing taking into account externalities such as cost of accidents 
and environmental and congestion costs. The purpose of this paper is to show the recent changes in the 
port industry and to investigate the issue of port pricing in theory and the possible application of marginal 
social cost pricing in European seaports. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Seaports are considered as an important link in distribution channels, particularly 
those involving international trade. The European port sector handles more than 90% of 
the Union’s trade with third countries and around 30% of intra-EU traffic. Moreover, 
ports are an essential interface between seaborne and land-based modes of transport. In 
ports, as in many other industries, prices can ‘make’ or ‘break’ a port. Efficient prices 
can lead to prosperity and growth; the wrong ones can cause bankruptcy or the 
proliferation of subsidies and inefficiency. Europe’s competitiveness in the global 
economy depends increasingly on an efficient and cost effective transport and port 
system. 
Traditionally, ports were considered as a public good. Consequently, pricing and 
investment in this sector were among the responsibilities of the public port authorities. 
These responsibilities also covered security and environmental problems. In recent 
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years, privatization has changed this image. Ports have become no different from any 
other multi-product industry offering a range of services and operating under different 
environments and organizational structures. Many port infrastructures or services are 
now owned or managed by the private sector.  
In spite of the lack of standardization and homogeneity in ports (the ownership; 
organization, and administration of ports as well as their size; pricing and subsidies with 
the functions and geographical location varying from country to country), the European 
Commission is keen to adopt a common approach to pricing in ports, assuring the real 
costs of port services should be borne by the users. Supporting this view, the Green 
Paper on Seaports and Maritime Infrastructure (1997) discusses common port policies 
in Europe. An adequate pricing system for port infrastructures and services is one of the 
main instruments for achieving efficiency in ports. Such a system could improve the 
efficiency of ports and ensure free and fair competition in the port industry. Hence, the 
European Commission White Paper (1998) suggests the use of social marginal cost 
pricing taking into account externalities such as the costs of accidents and 
environmental and congestion costs.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the issue of port pricing and to discus social 
marginal cost pricing in the EU port industry. It is organized in three parts. The first part 
of this work (section 2) describes the evolution in port management. The following 
section investigates the theory of optimal pricing in ports. Finally, section four discusses 
the feasibility of introducing marginal social cost in the European ports.  
 
 
2. Evolution in port management     
 
2.1. Natural monopoly and public goods in seaports 
 
Various theoretical reasons are given to justify public involvement in both the 
development and management of ports. Public intervention is mostly justified by either 
natural monopoly or public goods characteristics of some infrastructure and services 
provided in seaports.  
Port investment poses a problem of indivisibility, high sunk costs and increasing 
returns to scale1. Moreover, many port zones are conditioned by the geographical 
features of the coast, so the available area is very limited and it is necessary to use it in 
the most efficient way. Such seaports, which are serving captive hinterlands, have 
competitive advantages (lower transport costs than a competitive port structure, 
geographical position, etc.) and face little competition. Therefore, some seaports operate 
as a local natural monopoly. The "monopoly argument" in seaports is then, only 
relevant when inter-port competition is imperfect (Goss, 1999). For those ports who 
serve a captive hinterland, monopolistic power enables ports to discriminate according 
to the elasticity of demand, so that port users experience high tariffs. The most 
frequently used regulatory systems to prevent abuse from a dominant monopolist and to 
prevent market power is the application of price-cap and the limitation of firm profits 
                                                 
1 More details for these characteristics in seaports will be given in section 3.1.2. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 36 (2007): 4-26 
 6
through the rate of return or through the encouraging of intra-port competition2. 
Haralambides (2002) observes that for most ports, such captive hinterlands have 
diminished and that inter-port competition has become more intensive. Contestable 
hinterlands, those regions where there is no single port with a clear cost advantage, are 
more and more numerous and economic rents are smaller for competing ports.  
The market is also inefficient for the production of a particular category of goods. 
These are public goods and services. One can mention for example, streetlights, the 
police and transport infrastructure. A public good is consumed simultaneously by 
several people without one person decreasing the quantities available for the others. One 
understands that the good is only public if there is no congestion. It is the principle of 
non rivalry in consumption. The second characteristic of public goods is non-exclusion. 
Indeed, one cannot exclude the consumer who doesn't agree to pay. If a good satisfies 
this condition, its marginal cost is equal to zero. Non-rivalry and non-exclusion are the 
intrinsic properties of public goods (Kaul and al. 2001).    
However, the model according to which ports are seen as a public good begins to 
disappear and the present tendency is about the sharing of the functions in the port 
between the public and the private sectors. Given the importance of the investment in 
ports, the public nature of port infrastructures has been widely discussed in port 
economics.    
Goss (1990) defines public goods as "those which are unlikely to be provided 
sufficiently, satisfactorily, or at all by competitive industries". To the general 
characteristics of a public good, Goss (1990) adds a third one. He alludes to three 
distinct conditions for the presence of public goods in ports:    
 
• Their joint or non-rivalrous consumption; 
• The inability to exclude those who refuse to pay;   
• Their non-rejectability of consumption. 
 
Goss (1990) notes that although some infrastructures and port services fulfill these 
theoretical properties, the practices and the experiences of some European countries 
have proven that the private sector is also able to exploit the port activity. For example, 
navigation aids and dredging are non-rivalrous "because their cost will be exactly the 
same no matter how many people are using them". However, the UK port privatization 
serves to confirm that the private sector is able to provide these services and that the 
costs can be recovered through user charges. The supply of a dredged channel, 
considered as a public good, is really no more than a political decision as there is clearly 
evidence, particularly from the UK, that the market is able to provide a deep-water 
channel and make an economic return from it (e.g. Harwich Haven, Southampton etc.). 
The second condition noted above relates to the inability to exclude those who refuse to 
pay for the use of the facility. Vessels using a given navigation channel are relatively 
easily recognizable. Those who refuse to pay would be subject to legal proceedings 
brought against them. For Goss (1990), the non-rejectability of consumption means that 
it is impossible for a user to reject the consumption of a good or service. Lighthouses 
and the police and security services are some examples. However, competition is so 
intense that some ships refuse these services and divert to other ports especially when 
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the port serves a contestable hinterland. As Baird (2004) concludes, port users can reject 
a given port in favor of a competing facility elsewhere in the same region. The public 
good condition of non rejectability of consumption also therefore lacks substance.  
In the port sector, lighthouses are the typical example of a public good. All the ships, 
no matter their number, can benefit from the light (Kaul and al., 2001). In several 
countries, notably in GB, lighthouses have been constructed by private investors, by 
maritime transportation companies or by partnerships3. Nevertheless, economists 
continue to define as public goods those goods that have the same features of 
lighthouses, specifying that it is not possible to fix a charge against their use given their 
indivisible costs. In addition to lighthouses, Sloman (1997) classifies pavements, dikes 
and police as public goods. 
To identify public goods in seaports, Notteboom and Winkelmans (2001) classify port 
activities into two categories. The first one includes services whose costs can be covered 
by user charges. In this category, one can find pilotage, berthing, handling and storage. 
The second category includes the services provided without any discrimination between 
users. This category includes navigation aids, security, and the provision of a dredged 
channel. These services are defined as public services and should be provided by the 
public port authorities.   
Erol (2000) has a contrary view point concerning the privatization of pilotage. He 
thinks that it is a very important service that must combine quality and safety. He noted 
that the privatization of this service in some countries has not succeeded insofar as the 
competition pushed the private firms to minimize their costs by using unqualified staff 
and inexpensive equipment. In other countries, firms in a monopolistic position have 
discriminated between users in service quality and prices. The World Bank (2001, p71) 
has underlined the risks of privatizing pilotage and several countries have forbidden its 
privatization. This is the case of the EU countries and the United States.    
Some of these suggestions are a reaction to the publication of the European 
Commission Green Paper (1997). This paper considers that port access, quays and 
services related to navigation aids are considered as public goods. Consequently, their 
public financing is justified. The definition of a public good given by the European 
commission seems to be dictated not by the intrinsic characteristics of the good itself, 
but by political considerations (Bergantino and Coppejans, 2000). The aim of the 
following section is to identify to which extent public investment in ports is acceptable, 
notably in relation to its impact on competition.    
 
  
2.2. Public financing of ports 
 
The role of ports in economic growth justifies government intervention (Song and al., 
2001). The economic influence of a seaport also spreads beyond the industrial and 
commercial sectors of a nation to include a whole economic region. In practice, the 
responsibility of investment in ports is divided between the local, regional and federal 
authorities. In the most widespread model in the EU, the federal authority takes in 
charge dredging and investments in maritime and land access infrastructures, whereas 
the regional authority is responsible for the development of the operational 
infrastructures (construction and maintenance of terminals). It leaves to the private 
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sector the responsibility to provide equipment and probably the other types of 
superstructure (buildings, etc.). In the autonomous ports in France, the state finances 
80% of the investments in maritime access (dredging), 100% of their maintenance, and 
60% of the investments in quays. For the remainder, the ports are self-financed, either 
by borrowing or financed by the local collectivities. However, there are no subsidies in 
the United Kingdom where seaports (public or private) must be self-financed.    
Thus, there are two completely opposed arguments concerning the investment in the 
maritime ports. On one hand, the public nature of port infrastructures and their value 
added make it necessary for the state to finance them; on the other hand, subsidies 
hinder competition, and the non subsidized ports will be relatively penalized. 
Discussions about subsidies have increased with the increase in competition between 
Europeans ports.  
Public authorities justify subsidies by the high costs of dredging and by the number of 
jobs that can be created once the port activity is maintained. However, Baird (2004) 
notes that the creation of employment on a local or national scale through the port 
activity, in spite of its advantages, cannot justify the subsidies. Indeed, the supply and 
demand of employment are determined by macroeconomic factors. Subsidies can only 
displace the supply or the demand from one market to another. Subsidies come with an 
increase in taxes which makes the port zone less attractive for residents and for industry. 
We can mention another inconvenience of subsidizing ports: subsidies allow imports to 
compete with exports which can lower the number of jobs. In some ports like Hamburg, 
Antwerp, Rotterdam, Le Havre and Bremerhaven, the expenses of dredging 
maintenance are substantial. Thus, Baird (2004) qualifies these expenses as "public 
investments" and thinks that the only arguments that can justify subsidies must be the 
net effects on producers, consumers and on the environment in the whole region 
concerned. Naturally, every member state is free to finance or not its maritime ports. 
However, and on a European scale, the investment decisions must take into account the 
environmental and economic consequences. 
Van De Voorde and Winkelmans (2002) think that states should distinguish between 
public and private infrastructure in order to identify what can be subsidized. They 
consider that the financing of the basic infrastructures is tolerated. However, they don't 
explain why these infrastructures must be subsidized, nor to which extent the capital 
invested constitutes some "public good". 
A unique theoretical answer to the identification of public goods and their financing 
in ports doesn't exist. Indeed, the recent deregulation of port activity has shown that the 
private sector is also able to exploit infrastructures and to offer port services. 
 
 
2.3. Port activity deregulation 
 
According to UNCTAD (1992), one can distinguish three port generations. The first 
remained predominant until the 1950s: the port was limited to providing a refuge, to 
ensure the transfer of goods and the temporary storage and delivery of goods. The role 
of the second generation ports expanded to industrial and commercial activities and the 
port turned into a center of handling and services. This function became more 
pronounced again with the third generation. Since the beginning of the 1980s, and to 
this day, the port has become a center of logistics and distribution. Some important 
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European ports such as Rotterdam and Antwerp have blossomed according to this 
formula. 
The port infrastructure was therefore, for a long time, created, maintained and 
exploited by the public authorities. This model has begun to disappear with the growth 
of private capital in the construction of the infrastructure and the supply of port services. 
The models of port organization differ by the degree of the intervention of the private 
sector in the supply of infrastructure, superstructure and services. There are mainly four 
models: the Landlord port, the Tool port, the Public Service port and the Private Service 
port (World Bank 2001). 
   
Table 1: Involvement of the private sector in port activities. 
Management model Infrastructure Superstructure and equipment   Stevedoring 
Public service Port Public Public Public 
Tool Port Public Public Private  
Landlord port Public Private Private 
Private Service Port Private Private Private 
Source: Kruk (2005). 
  
The most widespread model in European ports is the Landlord port: the public sector 
is owner of the infrastructures and is responsible for regulation and control, whereas the 
private sector supplies services. The port authority plays the mediator's role between the 
public and private sector by coordinating the process of investment (Alfredo and 
Sabatino, 2005). 
Four types of reform tools have served to increase the involvement of the private 
sector in ports (World Bank, 2001; UNCTAD, 1995b). Firstly, commercialization 
consists of splitting the main port activities. It gives more flexibility to the created 
entities and authority to operate in an autonomous way. In practice, these entities don't 
enjoy total liberty since the state intervenes in the decision process, in particular pricing 
and investment policies. Secondly, corporatisation is where the port authority is 
transformed into a commercial organization. However, the infrastructure remains public 
property. The objective of the port authority is to make as much profit as private 
operators. The third tool is liberalization. This method permits the transition from a 
monopolistic structure to a form where the private sector is more engaged in the 
operational process and in investment. The last tool is privatization. For several authors, 
privatization is synonym to reform in the port sector whereas it is only a tool that 
permits the introduction of the private sector into the port sector (World Bank, 2001, 
p38). Few ports in the world have been completely privatized (for example in the 
United Kingdom, Hong Kong and New Zealand). Most countries prefer partial 
privatization where the terminals are privatized under a management contract or 
concession agreement or Built Operate Transfer (BOT)4. 
Several motives are at the origin of port reforms: the need for resources to modernize 
the port, to finance the infrastructure or the facilities, to reduce costs and the public 
deficit and to increase efficiency in some activities by introducing more flexibility 
(World Bank, 2001). 
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The involvement of the private sector in the port industry seems therefore feasible and 
desirable. So that, this sector can faces the increasing demand of maritime 
transportation. The type of the contract and price regulation are determining factors for 
the success of privatization and in the improvement of port efficiency. According to 
Song and al. (2001), the empirical studies haven't put into evidence the relation between 
the management model (public, private, or semi-public) and port efficiency. However, it 
has been shown that a positive relation exists between the involvement of the private 
sector in port activity and the increase in output (Estache and al., 2002). These 
conclusions are coherent with many economic findings that suggest that the separation 
between transportation activities where there are economies of scale (infrastructure 
supply) and other activities (the supply of services) reduces the total costs. However, 
one has to note that the fixing of cap prices can provoke the deterioration of the quality 
of services and can increase environmental damages. 
Public ownership in the seaport industry has usually been justified by the argument 
that seaports play a key role for national economies, and they have special 
characteristics that can easily provide the firms running port facilities with market 
power (expensive specialized assets, sunk costs, indivisibilities and economies of scale) 
or some public good characteristics. Moreover, in some countries seaports are regarded 
as focal points for regional development, which justify the subsidies from governments 
for the building and improvement of port facilities. In the last two decades, a more 
competitive environment led to a consideration of the role that the public sector must 
play in the running of seaports. 
International experiences have shown that private participation in both these aspects 
(operations and infrastructure) is beneficial for seaports. These experiences make a case 
for a revision of the traditional organization of seaports around the world, changes that 
will prepare ports for a more competitive market and less financial help from 
governments. The evolution of the port role and the involvement of private and public 
sector in port activity have induced a need of new models of port pricing. Thus, port 
pricing focused on the models of pricing that are based on cost but also on the strategic 
and commercial pricing that adjust more with the new forms of port organization. The 
forthcoming section is a literature review of the optimal port pricing. 
 
 
3. Port pricing   
 
3.1. Objectives and constraints 
 
Pricing is the main tool of resource allocation. The major elements that enter into the 
determination of the pricing system for a port are objectives and constraints. 
 
 
3.1.1. Port objectives 
 
The politics of pricing depends on the fixed objectives. These objectives depend on 
the supplier of the service (public or private) and on market conditions. For example, 
the price fixed to maximize profit (objective of the private supplier, so commercial 
pricing), is not the one that could maximize the social welfare (objective of the public 
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supplier, so marginal social cost pricing) or the one that permits to maximize the 
receipts. Sometimes the prices are fixed in order to reach objectives such as security, 
environment or to preserve a minimal market share. For port infrastructure, Bennathan 
and Walters (1979) have identified a major distinction between the European and 
Anglo-Saxon doctrines for setting port prices. They argue that European prices facilitate 
the economic growth of the port’s hinterland, whereas the Anglo-Saxons attempt to 
ensure that ports cover their costs and, where possible, make a profit irrespective of the 
effects on the wider local economy. 
The different objectives are complex and are often incompatible (see the table below 
for some examples). Whilst there are many transport pricing objectives, economists 
often focus on the pursuance of economic efficiency in the transport sector alone. Prices 
that are socially optimal are seen as the first-best benchmark (marginal cost pricing), 
which is in most cases politically desirable. 
 
Table 2: Pricing policy objectives and possible conflicts. 
Pricing Policy Objectives Conflicts 
Economic efficiency vs. profit maximization  
(or cost coverage) 
Efficient pricing of the use of transport capacity  
may lead to financial losses 
Profitability vs. income distribution Pricing for profitability may lead to higher transport 
prices with adverse effects on the poor income groups 
Economic efficiency vs. macroeconomic policy Macroeconomic price restraint policies may conflict with 
the need to increase transport prices during periods of 
congestion and excess demand 
Source: Adapted from United Nations, 2001. 
 
The main constraints for ports are related to the economic character of infrastructure 
and service production. These constraints lead some ports to choose one pricing system 
and not another. 
 
3.1.2. Port constraints 
 
Economists recognize that the market remains inefficient in the presence of two major 
problems that are the economies of scale and external effects. Indeed, when economies 
of scale exist, pricing at marginal cost does not generate enough revenue for the firm to 
be financially self-sufficient. Furthermore, the presence of externalities, in particular 
pollution, and security problems justify the intervention of the government in the 
production of port infrastructure and services. These constraints influence the chosen 
prices. 
 
Sunk costs and economies of scale 
 
The magnitude of fixed costs depends on the size of the port and its geographical 
position. For Rudolf (1995), in general, for container terminals, nearly 80% of the costs 
are independent of the number of the ships and the volume of the handled merchandise. 
For bulk merchandise, fixed costs are lower and represent 60% of the invariable costs 
with the volume. Much port infrastructure and equipment doesn't have any other use if 
the port activity is interrupted. Sunk costs are irretrievable investments and are 
sometimes much higher than fixed costs.  
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In order to analyze economies of scale for ports, Bennathan and Walters (1979) 
suggest that it is necessary into take in account two parameters which are localization 
and size effects. The localization effect concerns the optimal localization of the infra 
and superstructures. As the demand varies, and the technologies of construction and 
dredging change, the present localization of the infrastructure becomes inefficient. The 
increase in demand and the construction of new sites entail high fixed costs that cannot 
be compensated by the decrease in the unit variable cost of the new infrastructures. 
Analytically, the port moves toward lower cost curves that didn't exist before the move 
to an optimal localization. The use of more efficient infrastructures and facilities in 
terms of volume and of deeper accesses (bigger ships can enter the port), permits a 
reduction of unit costs: this is the size effect. Bennathan and Walters (1979) conclude 
that, combining localization and size effects, all things being equal and for a given 
interval of handled quantity, the larger the port, the lower are the costs. Bennathan and 
Walters (1979) mention that economies of scale in ports are limited by the volume of 
the output and the size of the market in the hinterland and note, finally, that the structure 
of the costs in the port depends extensively on the geographical conditions and the 
indivisibility of the investments: some ports need more or less investment and 
maintenance according to their geographical location. 
There are very few empirical studies on the evaluation of economies of scales for EU 
ports. The only studies have concerned Spanish ports. Both in infrastructure supply and 
cargo handling service, the authors have found increasing returns to scale. Four other 
studies have focused on economies of scale for the ports of Mobile, Melbourne and 
Ashdod. The results depend on the analyzed activity and the estimated function. The 
main conclusions are reported in the table below. 
 
Table3: Economies of scale in port activities 
Author Activity Estimated function Data Scale economies evaluated 
in the approximation point 
Martínez 
Budría (1996) 
Infrastructure 
 
Monoproductive 
cost function 
Panel data 
27 ports in Spain 
Increasing (S=3.47) 
Jara Díaz and 
al. (1997) 
Infrastructure 
 
Multiproductive 
cost function 
Panel data 
27 ports in Spain 
Increasing (S=1.43) 
Jara Díaz and 
al. (2002) 
Infrastructure Multiproductive 
cost function 
Panel data 
26 ports in Spain 
Increasing (S=1.69) 
Reker and al. 
(1990) 
Terminal-berth 
of containers 
Production 
function 
Panel data 
Three terminals in the port 
of Melbourne 
Decreasing 
Tongzon 
(1993) 
Terminal-berth 
of Containers 
 
Production 
function 
Panel data 
Three terminals in the port 
of Melbourne 
Increasing 
Tovar and al. 
(2005) 
Cargo 
handling 
Multiproductive 
cost function 
Panel data 
Tree port terminals in the 
Las Palmas port in Spain 
Increasing 
Chang (1978) No mention Production 
function 
Time series 
for the port of Mobile 
Constant 
Kim and 
Shachis 
(1986) 
Infrastructure 
and 
Services 
Monoproductive 
cost function 
Time series (the port of 
Ashdod) 
Increasing (S=1.3) 
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Pricing at marginal cost, when there are economies of scale, leads to a financial 
deficit. Unless the port activity is subsidized, the application of another pricing system 
is required.  
 
 
Externalities  
 
In transport infrastructure, external costs are those imposed by the users of the 
infrastructure on the others. These costs may take the form of congestion, accidents and 
environmental costs. The efficiency of maritime transportation is heavily dependent on 
the smooth operation of land transportation. The ease of cargo handling and swift modal 
transfers are keys to successful intermodal operations. Port congestion poses a serious 
problem for handling firms and can be sometimes too expensive for them. This cost can 
come back in terms of more elevated rates of freight, a congestion of the traffic 
associated with the handling operations, a decrease in the level of security and a loss in 
terms of competitiveness in the whole region. Port authorities can prevent such 
problems by changing prices to adapt the supply to the demand, so by imposing 
congestion charges. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Sources of externalities in seaports. 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD (1993). 
 
Given their position in coastal areas and the great variety of substances handled there, 
ports (especially those of a certain size) are now considerably complex systems from an 
environmental point of view. They tend to be associated with water and air pollution, 
soil contamination, problems related to dust and noise, the generation of waste, 
dredging operations, movement of ships, lorries and trains, warehouse storage of 
hazardous substances, etc. 
In addition, ports are usually close to urban centers. That means that the impact on the 
environment, including people, of certain accidents can be very serious. Given the 
properties of some substances that pass through ports (chemical products, hydrocarbons, 
fertilizers, etc. (Planas-Cuchi and al., 1997) and the operations that are carried out on 
them (loading and unloading, storage, transport) the possibilities of there being an 
accident are not negligible. In fact, there are periodic fires, explosions and toxic 
releases, with possible consequences of financial losses, etc. In addition to these direct 
consequences, another quite important aspect of these situations is the negative image 
Externalities in seaports 
Ships Merchandise Port Hinterland
Industrial 
activities 
Storage 
Maintenance 
Development 
Handling  
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they give to the port, with the possible creation of a feeling of rejection among the 
population (Planas-Cuchi and al., 1998). All this justifies the importance of taking into 
account external costs when fixing prices. 
The economic consequences of the economies of scale and externalities have justified 
for a long time public intervention into port activity. Considering their geographical 
position and the network of transportation, several European ports form, for a very big 
part of their traffic, a natural monopoly, notably when they constitute the necessary 
passage for a maritime company between two links. Between competition and 
monopoly, and with the evolution of the role of the port (from regional economic 
interest to a multiproduct firm), the literature of port pricing has focused on the pricing 
systems based on costs but also on other systems like strategic and commercial pricing. 
 
 
3.2. Port pricing: literature review 
 
Optimal pricing, although discussed considerably less in the economic theory for 
ports than for the other transportation infrastructures, remains the most controversial 
question concerning port economics. The first discussions on optimal pricing for port 
infrastructure and services began in the 1970s with Heggie (1974) and Walters (1974) 
and continue until now with Goss and Stevens (2001) and Haralambides (2002).  
The current ideas on port pricing didn't have any theoretical foundations and just 
expressed points of view and recommendations. For Gardner (1977) for example, port 
tariffs traditionally based on ships and goods characteristics, should only be based on 
the nature of goods themselves. Whereas Thomas (1978) notes that port tariffs could 
form a meaningful proportion of the ocean freight rates. According to him, these 
charges must take into account several factors such as the nature of the commodities, 
their volume, the elasticity of demand and the type of the ship.  
The end of the 1970s were characterized by the development of these rather simplistic 
thoughts and pricing systems toward the recommendation of more suitable pricing 
policies based on costs and efficiency objectives. With the recent participation of the 
private sector in port activity, other pricing principles, such as commercial or strategic 
pricing, have emerged. The presence of several actors in the port and the conflicts of 
interests between them are the main reason for "There is no single solution to the port 
pricing problem" (Strandenes and Marlows, 2000). The principles of port pricing can be 
classified in two categories: cost based pricing and alternative pricing methodologies. 
 
 
3.2.1. Cost based pricing 
 
Port authorities must have at least minimal knowledge of short and long-run costs of 
infrastructure use. This knowledge is necessary for an efficient running of the port 
activity, to adopt the best financial and administrative techniques and to take the 
appropriate investment decisions. As the scheduling of investments and the evaluation 
of the demand elasticity pass by prices, tariffs must correctly reflect the level of costs. 
This principle must be applied separately for all the activities in the port (infrastructure 
and services). The debate on cost based pricing turns mainly around marginal cost 
pricing (MCP) which is efficient and fair from an economic view and the methods of 
costs recovery. 
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Marginal cost pricing and congestion pricing 
 
Marginal cost pricing in ports found its justification in public economy. In fact, most 
authors consider that ports are public goods, like road infrastructure, and that users 
should pay for the marginal social cost (MSC). This approach that privileges users who 
are ready to pay for the totality of the costs including the external costs, has been 
supported by some economists. However, the only externality that was considered was 
congestion.  
Button (1979) set out to assess the viability of an economic-based pricing system 
arguing also that the users of a port (when viewed as a public utility) should be charged 
the full marginal social opportunity cost of the resources that they use. Using a simple 
model dealing with the economic allocation of car-parking places, he demonstrates that 
once the port capacity is not optimal, port authorities must levy a congestion charge to 
eliminate the excess of demand. 
Bennathan and Walters (1979) conclude that, under perfect competition hypotheses, 
optimal port pricing is the one based on the short-run marginal cost if port capacity is 
optimal. They also note that there are economies of scale both in the supply of port infra 
and superstructure. So, short-run marginal cost pricing leads to a budget deficit and the 
port activity must be subsidized. These authors recognize additionally that these perfect 
conditions don't hold in reality. In general, ports are organized as a monopoly or cartel. 
The capacity is rarely optimal and the port must always face quay and hangar 
congestion. Bennathan and Walters (1979) show, supposing that port activity is 
monopolized, that it is more advantageous for the port authorities to increase the prices 
once the demand exceeds the supply. First of all, it constitutes an opportunity to 
appropriate the surplus caused by the growth of the demand. Secondly, these resources 
can constitute a self-financing for future investments. The third advantage is that 
congestion taxes encourage a more efficient use of the infrastructure. The main problem 
of congestion taxes remains administrative difficulties. Moreover, when some port 
charges are combined, it becomes difficult to fix the optimal tax. 
Goss and Stevens (2001) join Bennathan and Walters (1979) in giving some 
arguments in favor of the short-run marginal cost pricing. They note that, under some 
conditions, this pricing system maximizes social welfare. The first condition is that all 
costs must be taken into account including those that don't appear in the accounting. 
These are externalities like congestion, pollution and noise. The second condition is to 
use a definition of marginal costs adapted to the accounting system. The last hypothesis 
is that all prices in the economy must be set to a marginal level. The exclusion of some 
externalities and the existence of some monopolistic pressures and taxes are barriers to 
the validity of this theory. 
The defendants of MCP distinguish between long-run and short-run marginal cost 
pricing5. At this level, the points of view are different enough. By explaining the 
consequences of short-run and long-run marginal cost pricing under three different 
hypotheses (optimal capacity, sub-optimal capacity, and over-capacity in ports), 
                                                 
5 Long-run marginal costs also include the capital costs of increasing capacity to accommodate an 
increase in output but have proven rather difficult to measure. It is only where capacity is non-optimal 
that the issue arises. Short-run MCP is seen as offering optimal use of existing capacity, whereas long-run 
MCP offers appropriate incentives to invest, although it may require regulatory action to ensure that the 
investment takes place. 
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Bennathan and Walters (1979) conclude that in all these cases, it is worth fixing prices 
at short-run marginal cost. Contrary to these two authors, Haralambides (2002) and 
Bromwich (1978) think that pricing must be based on the long-run costs in order to 
ensure the economic viability of the port. We can see clearly the difference between the 
two concepts by taking a look at the following graph, adapted from Haralambides 
(2002). 
 
Figure 2: Marginal cost pricing in ports. 
Source: adapted from Haralambides (2002, p333). 
 
Assuming that the seaport operates under perfect competition, we suppose that the 
production structure is adequately described by SRMC (the short-run marginal cost), 
SRAC (the short-run average cost) and LRAC and LRMC (respectively the long-run 
average and marginal costs). Suppose first that the port operates under economies of 
scale and then the level of demand it has to satisfy is Q1, which is smaller than Q0. 
Pricing at short-run marginal cost (P1) will lead to a deficit of AB. However, pricing at 
long-run marginal cost (P0) will reduce this deficit to AF. For Haralambides (2002), if 
the port pursues a cost recovery objective, pricing at long-run marginal cost is more 
appropriate6. Public funding in this case is allowed given that it is temporary and 
declining. Indeed, given economies of scale, in the long-run (the point F gives the long-
run equilibrium), the quantity of output Q1 will be produced by a much smaller port. On 
the contrary, if the capacity is suboptimal, the port exhibits diseconomies of scale. The 
demanded quantity of output is given by Q2 and congestion is a chronic problem for the 
port. At the same time, the port realizes economic rent given by CD. For Haralambides 
(2002), this situation is not sustainable in the long term. Attracted by the supernormal 
profits, the port's competitors will invest and expand to capture part of the economic 
rent, what gives the long-run equilibrium position of the port at the point G. In the case 
of constant returns to scale (the equilibrium is situated at point E), long-run and short-
                                                 
6 However, for Bennathan and Walters (1979), low prices (SRMC< LRMC) reflect the excess of capacity 
and encourage the use of the infrastructure. Short-run marginal cost is then more appropriate. 
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run marginal costs are equal. Pricing at marginal cost will attract just enough traffic to 
cover the port's cost. This was the spirit and philosophy of the European Commission's 
White Paper on fair payment for infrastructure use which ascertained that "the entire 
infrastructure complex of the EU as a whole may not exhibit economies of scale". This 
means that, at least, at an aggregated level, it should be possible to recover total costs 
through pricing at marginal cost (Haralambides, 2002). 
The choice between short-run and long-run marginal costs depends on economies of 
scale and the efficiency of the investment policy (capacity). The marginal cost 
determination is complicated, in particular for port services and infrastructures. In fact, 
several costs are common which make the differentiation between variable and the fixed 
costs associated to every service difficult enough. 
The approach of marginal cost pricing, which is a merely theoretical approach, has 
been criticized because of the difficulty of the evaluation of marginal costs and the 
application of this system in the real world. This has led some economists, who 
recognize all the same that port pricing must be based on costs, to recommend other 
more convenient pricing systems that permit the recovery of the costs such as the 
Ramsey pricing and two-part tariffs. 
 
 
Ramsey pricing and two-part tariffs 
 
In his paper, Button (1979) evokes the drawbacks of marginal cost pricing and 
suggests three methods to recover the costs. The first consists in subsidizing the port 
activity, the second consists in applying discriminatory charges between users and the 
last method intends to apply the two part tariff. In order not to diverge from a marginal 
cost pricing, Button (1979) suggests that the first tariff component equals the marginal 
social cost and that the second consists of a fixed charge levied for the right to use the 
facility. 
Walters (1974) also thinks that marginal cost pricing constitutes an appropriate basis 
for port pricing. But when the port is congested or when there are economies of scale, it 
is necessary that port authorities set prices higher than average cost (which is not the 
marginal cost in most cases). Through examples of dredged channels supply, congested 
ports and cargo handling, Walters (1974) argues that two part tariff is more appropriate 
for ports than marginal cost pricing. Two part tariffs have the advantages (based on 
costs) and not the disadvantages (budgetary deficit and subsidies) of a marginal cost 
pricing. 
Heggie (1974) was also one of the first economists to put forth some arguments in 
favour of cost based pricing. For him, the achievement of the port objectives and 
fairness are the most important reasons for which pricing must hinge on social costs7. 
Heggie (1974) opposed discriminatory and non transparent subsidies in particular and 
suggested the revision of the pricing system after every new investment. For Heggie 
(1974), in the case of congestion, excessive demand requires an intensive use of the 
infrastructure that should come with an investment. Fairness requires the spent capital to 
                                                 
7 For Heggie (1974), social costs include environment and accident costs. But these are difficult to 
estimate.  
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be collected from the users through pricing rather than local taxpayers8. Therefore, it is 
necessary to apply a suitable pricing system by taking costs into account. 
Jansson and Rydén (1979) developed a theoretical model of optimal pricing based on 
the costs of the inputs. Their proposition is different from the two-part tariff system 
used in the ports. Indeed, their model divides the port charges into two parts. The first 
component is a charge per ton of cargo that would be differentiated with respect to the 
elasticity of demand. And the second component is a charge levied on the carrier to 
reflect the opportunity cost of using the facility that is, optimal occupancy charges. It is 
the Value of Service Principle (VSP) that is similar to the Ramsey pricing (Ramsey, 
1927) where the costs allocation permits the reflection of the elasticity of demand and 
recovery of the costs. In this case, the common costs are allocated reflecting differences 
among different users in elasticity of demand for the specific port services. Monopoly 
port services tend to be inelastic as long as port costs make up a fairly low share of the 
price of the cargo though even in monopoly ports there may be alternatives for storage 
outside the port. Elasticity of demand therefore may be lower for cargo handling 
services than for the navigational aids offered by the port. If so, this difference should 
be reflected in the allocation of common costs. 
 
 
3.2.2. Alternative methodologies 
 
Strategic port pricing 
 
According to this approach, pricing is a strategic issue that must be guided by the port 
objectives. In his paper, Meyrick (1989) had considered that "insofar as the focus in 
pricing is on costs at all, it is on the average cost of service provision rather than the 
marginal cost" and that typically "port accounting systems are incapable of providing a 
basis for pricing on anything other than an average cost basis". He concluded his paper 
by suggesting several axioms for port pricing. He argues in particular for full cost 
recovery and that those costs arising from services or facilities provided for an 
identifiable user or group of users should be recovered from that user or group of users. 
A similar axiomatic approach has been proposed by Talley (1994). He showed that 
this method can avoid the conflicts which might emerge between marginal cost pricing 
and full cost recovery in ports. He defines the axiomatic approach of pricing as "a 
pricing mechanism which determines the prices of the outputs of multi-product firms by 
allocating the full cost of production to all the outputs". Supposing that the demand for 
port services is relatively inelastic with respect to port prices and taking the pricing 
mechanism of Aumann-Shapley (that respects the following five axioms: cost sharing, 
rescaling, consistency, positivity and additivity), Talley proposes four axioms applicable 
to port pricing. These are rescaling, attributability, allocating and additivity which he 
then applies to container terminals. This methodology can help port authorities to 
determine prices that allow for full cost recovery without having to estimate marginal 
costs. 
Finally, UNCTAD (1995a) mentions that pricing is a strategic question. Port 
authorities have to choose between the economic method based on marginal cost pricing 
and the financial method based on cost accounting. The chosen method can serve to 
                                                 
8 Heggie proposes a pricing formula that takes into account operational costs (incliding the costs of 
capital replacement). See Heggie (1974) for more details. 
European Transport \ Trasporti Europei  n. 36 (2007): 4-26 
 19
accomplish the different objectives of the port. It is the CPV approach (Cost, 
Performance, and Value) that determines an interval for prices. Its pillars are as 
following:  
- A cost based pricing for the port use.  
- Pricing based on performance maximizes the output and reduces the congestion. 
- Pricing based on the value of the services sufficiently generates income to cover the 
costs. 
In order to improve the competitiveness of the port sector, Strandenes and Marlows 
(2000) proposed a pricing system based on the quality of the services that is, 
commercial pricing.  
 
 
Commercial pricing 
 
In most sectors of the economy, prices depend on the quality of the good or service. 
For Strandenes and Marlow (2000) port tariffs must be based on the quality of the 
services since it is quantifiable. The dimension "quality" includes some elements such 
as the time in port, punctuality, handling with minimum of damages, etc. The authors 
recommend a two-part tariff system. The first component doesn't depend on the quality 
of the service. The second one increases with the level of quality (reflected by the 
duration of port stay, the waiting time etc.). Such a pricing system sensitizes the port 
authorities and the ship-owners with respect to time (delays of transportation and 
handling). It also permits the improvement of the competitiveness of maritime 
transportation in relation to road transportation. 
 
 
The ratio equilibrium 
 
The ratio equilibrium can be interpreted as a competitive equilibrium of a market 
economy for which each agent receives a price signal, that consist in paying a share of 
the total cost personalized in such a way that each agent demands the same quantity of 
the good (Bergantino, 2002). The solutions obtained fall within the stand alone core: in 
other words, if each agent has the possibility of constructing the infrastructure that he 
needs, with existing technology, he would pay more than the share of the cost that he 
would have been assigned through the ratio equilibrium allocation criteria. Bergantino 
and Coppejans (2000) apply this concept to allocate maritime infrastructure cost and 
determine the optimal tariff structure for calculating the usage fees for the access 
channel to the port of Antwerp.  
The general conclusion that one can draw from the review of the literature on port 
pricing is that "the prices must be based on the costs" (Button, 1979). However, the 
choice of an optimal "basis" for pricing, in spite of its theoretical interest, hasn't found 
the necessary attention when it concerned its implementation. The financial results are 
the privileged objective of the port authorities and the principles of social welfare are 
little known by decision-makers. The systems of pricing have remained complicated and 
have rarely reflected the structure of costs (Meyrick, 1991). According to Goss and 
Stevens (2001), it is in part the economists who excessively complicated the concepts 
and don't explain the direct relation between the economic theory and port activity. 
They rarely explain the difference between long-run and short-run costs and the 
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importance to go beyond the costs to include social costs. With regard to social costs, 
very few authors have noted the importance of internalizing the costs of accidents and 
the environmental costs (see Heggie, 1974; Button, 1979). The following section 
intends to investigate the possible implementation of MSCP in European seaports. 
 
 
4. Implementation of MSC pricing in ports 
 
4.1. The European Commission point of view 
 
On a European level, the question of pricing in transport has often focused on the 
debate concerning budgetary balance versus marginal social cost. This debate results 
from the theoretical arguments in favor of the two approaches. The preoccupations of 
the EC have evolved toward the integration of environmental costs into its pricing 
policies. In its Green Paper (1995), the EC underlines the importance of setting an 
efficient and equitable pricing system. The Green Paper indicates that a very clear shift 
exists between the prices paid by the users and the real costs. In particular, the costs 
related to accidents, to congestion and scarcity and to pollution are partially covered. 
The European Commission’s 1997 Green Paper advocates a general framework 
requiring charges to be linked to costs. Different approaches are possible with regard to 
infrastructure costs: average cost pricing; charging for operating costs only and 
marginal cost pricing. Outside the port area, the Commission advocates a user-pays 
policy for all modes of transport, which would make for fair competition and affect the 
distribution of cargo flows among European ports. In 1998, the European Commission's 
common transport policy led to a White Paper which established the EU's intentions to 
apply short-run marginal social cost pricing to all transport modes. The major 
motivations behind this pricing policy are to improve efficiency, generate revenues and 
internalize the various externalities (congestion, scarcity, noise, environmental 
emissions and accidents). 
Short-run marginal costs are the additional operating and maintenance costs 
associated with a marginal increase in output without any increase in physical capacity. 
If external costs are also included, this is referred to as marginal social cost (Alder and 
al., 2003). When capacity is optimal, short-run and long-run marginal costs are 
equivalent. The first one tends to be associated with regimes where government bodies 
take investment decisions and the second with regulated private infrastructure 
managers. However, another important issue is the time lags both in the adjustment of 
demand to price and of capacity to demand. Where capacity is slow to adjust and where 
demand adjusts reasonably quickly, short-run MCP is likely to be more efficient. This is 
indeed the approach taken by the EC, although not all economists agree. However, the 
issue of port pricing and the commission's involvement in it has not only risen from an 
academic basis but also as a response to the need felt in the port industry itself for a self 
disciplining mechanism that, if consistently applied, would eventually lead to the 
recovery of port investments and to future investments that are largely demand driven. 
This requirement has been the result of the recognition that, in the intensified regional 
port competition of today and the increasingly tightened fiscal constraints of an 
integrated Europe, it is no longer acceptable to discriminately and without a formal 
economic rationale spend taxpayer money on port investment, often aimed at increasing 
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market share at the expense of the other ports, particularly those in neighboring member 
states (Haralambides and al., 2001). Nevertheless, the question which arises is whether 
the adoption of any financing or pricing system, or set pricing principles at the 
European level would be a valid policy option, given the significant constraints that 
exist and that may prevent or delay the implementation of MSCP in ports. These 
constraints include economic, organizational and acceptability-related barriers.  
 
 
4.2. Barriers to the implementation of MSC pricing 
 
4.2.1. Economic constraints 
 
The analysis of present pricing policies in European ports, conducted as part of the 
ATENCO study, demonstrated the substantial diversity prevailing among EU ports with 
regard to their financing, accounting and charging practices. This diversity is deeply 
rooted in various judicial and cultural traditions, as well as in the divergent port 
management styles, related responsibilities and degree of autonomy. Current port 
pricing practices have been mainly based on empirical intuition and past trends. These 
tariff levels do not reflect the actual costs levied by the port operations and they do not 
recover all the costs, thus creating severe inefficiencies such as congestion as well as 
sources of significant financial loss. Meersman and al. (2002) argue that outlining a 
typology of current port pricing schemes is not possible due to the complex, 
untransparent and archaic systems in existence at present. 
European ports work under widely different conditions. Some ports suffer significant 
overcapacity, while others are lacking in infrastructure. Indeed, it is difficult to say that 
short-run MCP is an efficient pricing basis for all ports. Another argument, is the one 
that "in attempting to apply MCP to ports, a practical problem arises – the inability of 
ports to determine the marginal costs of their services" (Talley, 1994) and the difficulty 
to estimate external costs. Mayers and Proost (2003) showed that efficiency, equity and 
acceptability of any reform in pricing, depend not only on the change in transport prices, 
but also on the way the extra revenues are used. Here, one can wonder if implementing 
MSCP in privatized or semi-privatized ports is appropriate. Appling the polluter pays 
principle in seaports must be highly regulated to ensure that private operators use 
efficiently tax revenues to reduce port externalities. Furthermore, efficient pricing in the 
port sector will not be able to bring about the expected welfare effects if the rest of the 
related infrastructure is not priced accordingly. The issue thus appears to be reaching a 
standstill, particularly in view of the fact that in most countries, ports are considered as 
part of the country's infrastructure and thus State investment in ports is considered as 
'public investment' outside the reach and mandate of the European Commission. In this 
particular context, Haralambides and al. (2001) note that, a voice that is often loudly 
raised, by both the commission (recently) and the port industry, argues that MC pricing 
applied to ports only, will make port services 'unilaterally' more expensive thus 
penalizing the union's efforts to check road traffic and promote short sea shipping. 
Some authors note that pricing matters (at least in a liberal economic environment 
such as that in the EU) ought to be, ideally, left to the producers (ports) themselves 
(Haralambides and al., 2001). They argue also that greater private sector interest in the 
port industry, as well as in the rest of the Europe's infrastructure, necessitates some form 
of cost based pricing that would allow the recovery of port investments. This could, 
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however, disturb the existing "equilibrium" among ports that has been established over 
the years as a result of each port's particular characteristics such as geographical 
location, proximity to markets, navigational constraints, subsidies and types of 
financing. Among competing container ports, like those of Western Europe, such a 
"disturbance" can have marked impacts on ports' market shares, as a result of the ease 
with which carriers can nowadays switch between ports. Swahn (2002) argues that port 
infrastructure pricing, given certain boundary conditions of accounting and 
transparency, could be left up to ports as market actors without causing any significant 
distortions. 
Finally, Matthews and al. (2002) state that "MCP is clearly much easier to implement 
where the infrastructure manager is a public body, funded largely from general taxation, 
as in Sweden". On the other hand, Jansson and Shneerson (1982), Verhoeff (1981) and 
Dowd and Flemming (1994) think that it is more difficult to allocate costs in Public 
Ports in a way that is largely arbitrary compared to costs in Landlord Ports where more 
clear lines of responsibility and accountability exist. 
 
 
4.2.2. Organizational constraints 
 
If the aim of a global European policy is the establishment of a "level playing field" 
among competing European ports, it should be recognized that any assessment of 
potential improvements cannot be solely undertaken in terms of purely market based 
considerations. In contrast to many other sectors where liberalization and market based 
rules have been widely credited as instrumental to the creation of better and best 
practices, the diversity of the port sector requires uniform methods of accounting and 
cost recovery using a step-by-step approach. Undoubtedly, such an approach should 
consider, at least in the short-run, national perception on the appropriate role of public 
investment, still the prerogative of member states. However, considerable progress 
could be made through efforts aimed at harmonizing definitions and classifications of 
port infrastructure. Current classifications (eg. investment inside or outside the port 
area) often lack an economic rationale and are instead based on technical or 
geographical considerations aimed at determining whether investment costs should be 
allocated directly to users or to society at large (Haralambides and al. 2001). 
Pricing external costs will need to establish some organizational structure to ensure 
that taxes are effectively used to reduce congestion and environmental damage. Given 
the different port models, this seems to be relatively complicated. The lack of data and 
the lack of harmonization of pricing principles across EU countries is also not 
considered. Both parameters imply that, to make some headway in formulating 
institutional change, substantial attention should be devoted to historical trajectories and 
path dependencies associated with specific (sub)national port financing and pricing 
routines. If not, the danger exists that substantial unintended policy effects might arise.  
Alder and al. (2003) note also that, for ports, there is no agreed pricing formula 
defined at the EU level or EC Directive, as there is currently for rail. "For inland 
shipping and waterways, the major barrier to the implementation of any pricing scheme 
on the river Rhine is the Mannheim convention (1868), as one of its main principles is 
exemption from navigation duties. However, this does not prevent the introduction of 
port related charges, but rather will cause difficulties in introducing en-route charges to 
account for emission externalities" (Alder and al., 2003). 
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4.2.3. Acceptability 
 
The increasing transformation of ports (at least for competing regional container 
terminals) from public to private enterprises raises the issue of the desirability and 
fairness of pricing methods focusing on the "user" rather than the "general taxpayer" 
(Green Paper, 1997). Cost recovery implies that port revenues will be generated from 
the user of a facility, who will have to somehow pass these costs on to the final 
consumer. This consumer will in all likelihood have to pay higher prices for the goods 
he consumes but, at least in efficient markets, he is compensated by correspondingly 
paying fewer taxes (for infrastructure investments). Obviously, the problem that arises 
is the acceptability of such a switch. By changing prices, port authorities and private 
companies fear that users will move to other ports. 
The power of oligopolistic shipping lines and hub ports are likely to pose serious 
political barriers to MCP implementation. Indeed, in the seaport sector, several actors 
may be involved in the vertical port activities chain and the horizontal port activity 
cluster. Because of the potential of unintended policy impact, different financing 
disciplines externally imposed on ports may disturb the effective horizontal and vertical 
linkages among the various port actors.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We have witnessed in recent years a significant change in the organization of the port 
industry in the EU. The British port sector is a very good example in this respect. 
Private sector intervention has affected all the port services and activities, even those 
that where considered as public goods and those that must be controlled by the public 
authority for security and environmental reasons (aids to navigation, pilotage, dredging, 
etc.). While such sweeping change has not occurred in the case of continental ports, 
there has been an unmistakable trend towards greater autonomy and a more substantial 
private stake in goods handling. We can find different management models in EU ports 
where the involvement of the private sector varies widely (Public Service port, Tool 
Port, Landlord Port and Private Service Port). In spite of these changes, the European 
legislation seems to lack precision when it concerns identifying and financing public 
goods in ports. 
Neither is the situation clear concerning pricing. The Green Paper (1997) suggests 
several pricing methods (marginal cost pricing, average cost pricing, etc.) to ensure cost 
recovery and to apply the user-pays principle. To establish a common European 
transport policy, the White paper (1998) recommends the application of marginal social 
cost pricing (MSCP) to all transport modes. This pricing approach will improve 
efficiency and ensure free and fair competition in the transport sector. Nevertheless, the 
EC has not specified which costs should be taken into account in the port sector. 
Although MSC constitutes a first best in economics, its application seems to be 
controversial in the port sector. We can find economic, organizational and acceptability 
related barriers to its implementation. 
On the one hand, if there are economies of scale, MSCP leads to a financial deficit. 
Therefore, port activity needs to be subsidized. On the other hand, subsidies hinder 
competition, especially in some economic regions like the EU. So, free and fair 
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competition and MSCP in European seaports are two incompatible goals. Even if we 
suppose that the port authority may let several private operators do a bid to acquire the 
port operation where the private operators also mention the prices they will charge to 
the users and the subsidy they wish to receive from the port authority, several 
organizational constraints will form a barrier to the application of MSCP. Moreover, 
this will certainly create inefficiencies and acceptability problems in the port sector. The 
lack of European harmonization in what concerns accounting, financing, the physical 
infrastructure limits and the costs to take into account are also barriers to the 
implementation of MSCP. Other reasons are related to the difficulty of estimating 
marginal costs, both internal and external. Finally, there are acceptability constraints. 
For the users, port prices and dues will be higher if they have to pay for external costs 
too. Ports authorities and operators fear that they will move to other ports. For the 
consumer, the price of goods will be higher. Here, the problem arises whether they will 
agree to pay higher prices for goods and less tax for infrastructure investment. 
Therefore, although some aspects of MSCP are important and appreciable (attention 
to environment, necessity of a cost based pricing and for harmonization to improve 
efficiency, etc.), this pricing principle does not seem appropriate to meet the objectives 
of the European commission. We think that MSCP permits the application of users/pays 
principle only if marginal costs are calculated for each activity when analyzed 
individually. Given the economic characteristics of seaport costs and the diversity of 
port activities, this seems to be very difficult. Moreover, European Commission 
objectives concern the development of a level playing field between ports and the 
reduction of public financing in port infrastructure. MSCP is not, by definition, 
consistent with all these objectives.  
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